Introduction
When Russian plans for a Eurasian economic community were first announced in 2012, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton lashed out at the Kremlin's 'attempts to reSovietize' the former Soviet space; as she ominously put it, ' We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out ways to slow down or prevent it'.
1 Ever since, the idea that Russia's Great Power identity is necessarily associated with seeking a sphere of influence in the 'Near Abroad' has been gaining currency. 2 This association is nevertheless debatable. The question is not simply whether Russia has a sphere-ofinfluence policy in the former Soviet Union (FSU), or whether such a policy can succeed. The core meaning of the concept of 'sphere of influence' contains specific and very familiar assumptions about state, space and power, not least in its essentialization of bounded, exclusionary space and a narrow reading of power. 
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Spheres of influence and Great Games in the 'heartland'
As Susanna Hast has pointed out, 'when we go looking for a theoretical conceptualization of what a sphere of influence is, we will find a debate on the role of the state'. 13 This is not just because the concept is explicitly linked to the statecraft of imperial powers in the latter half of the 19 th century. Modern, Westphalian representations of statehood revolve around the 'territorial trap', thinking the state as an autonomous agent constituted by an inexorable link between sovereign power and exclusive control over bounded territory. 14 These assumptions are also reproduced in dominant understandings of 'Sphere of Influence'. Unlike hegemony or soft power, concepts that also seek to express the idea of an external influence by means other than the use of force, the concept 'sphere of influence' is explicitly spatial in nature, and the spatial imagination that underpins it is unambiguously Westphalian in its depiction of power over space as exclusionary control, exercised by autonomous state-agents.
As a concept of diplomatic practice, 'sphere of influence' reflected the dominance of the imperial Great Powers and their global competition for space, not least in the early 20 th century 'Great Game' between the British and Russian empires in Central Asia. 15 One of the specific meanings of the concept at the time was its delineation in direct negotiation between imperial powers, without any agency for the influenced states and territories. 16 This was connected to a conception of space that foregrounded boundedness and exclusion, as in aspirations to the exclusive influence of one Great
Power over a clearly delineated territory. Thus, in the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention formalizing Russian and British spheres of influence in Central Asia, Afghanistan was described as a sovereign state "outside the sphere of Russian influence," and committed to conduct all its external relations "through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government". 17 The Great Game reflected the rise of geopolitical narratives as deterministic explanations of world politics. 18 A few years before the Anglo-Russian convention,
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Halford Mackinder formulated a direct connection between spheres of influence in
Central Asia and a global balance of power. He designated Central Eurasia (broadly speaking present day Central Asia as well as Russia east of the Ural mountains) as the 'heartland', the 'geographical pivot of history' whose control promised world domination. 19 This kind of geopolitical determinism describes world politics as zerosum competition for control over territory, whether directly (empire or military occupation) or indirectly (spheres of influence). It also contains an ontology of Great Powers as quintessentially Westphalian sovereign subjects: unitary, strategic actors defined by an ability to project power in space, be it by military means or 'statecraft'. 20 This focus on direct agreements between Great Powers, competition for exclusive space, a causal view of power as control achieved through the deployment of tools of statecraft, and the writing out of the agency of smaller states has remained at the core of the concept, even as it became de-legitimized as an international norm after the first World War. 21 In fact, its disappearance from the acceptable vocabulary of international relations did not mean the end of spheres of influence. On the contrary, the de-legitimation and increasing politicization of the term went hand in hand with the continued practice of sphere-of-influence policies by the superpowers during the Cold War. The fixation and division of space represented by the concept was deepened by the addition of a new element -ideological enmity and thus the fixation of difference at a much deeper, totalizing, level. 22 De facto Soviet and American spheres of influence were asserted by the transformation of the totality of society into communist or capitalist systems. This was bounded space as container, not of a 'domestic' of no concern to understanding the international, but of clearly articulated and irreconcilable difference.
After the Cold War, the language of geographical determinism remains an enduring trope in commentary on Russia. 23 These critiques raise important points, but they ultimately do not break with the geopolitical imagination underlying the narrative of a 'return of spheres of influence'.
They remain wedded to ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of the state and power that determine the questions they ask: about the intentions of actors, or the success or failure of policy strategies. This closes down pathways for understanding the dynamics of state, space and power in the relationship between Russia and the states of post-Soviet Central Asia. These relations are taking place in a particular historical context, locally and globally, that highlights the point made by
Agnew about the static ontology of the 'territorial trap': it produces an image of the state that has never been more than a historically contingent idea. 28 The influx of classical geopolitical tropes, and in particular the return of 'spheres of influence' as an analytical lens, obscure the multiple ways in which imperial and Soviet legacies -and the ambivalences of state and space that result from them -produce power, space and the state in the region. The tension between these experiences of the state and images of state strength circulating in the region has been described as a 'paradox'. 36 However, the persistence of discourses of the strong, autonomous state also highlights how 'the state' operates as a myth that is enacted by post-Soviet state elites to legitimize their claims to power, in sometimes spectacular performances. 37 Soviet republics with the exception of Russia, was granted sovereignty on the basis of the principle of ethno-territoriality -homelands of a primordially defined nation. 41 However, within the USSR, understandings of sovereignty were more ambivalent, effectively departing from the Westphalian idea of sovereignty as exclusive control over territory. Thus, Soviet legal discourse formulated a sovereignty 'surplus' in relations between the Union republics and the Soviet centre, effectively a 'doublingup' of sovereignty claims on the same territory. 42 This was a reflection of even more pronounced ambivalences of sovereign power in political practice, introduced by the dissociation of political authority from the structures of the territorial state and its location in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 43 In the post-Soviet myth of the state circulating between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, conceptions of sovereignty take a prominent place, as do representations of space.
But as will be seen in the next section, these understandings cannot be reduced to the meaning of bounded territorial sovereignty that appears to be the model for the many conscious elite-led attempts at state-and nation-building in Central Asia. 44 The space of the former Soviet Union is the product of two ambivalently intertwined processesthe collapse of the Soviet Union and the reconfiguration of those imperial relations that were preserved (albeit radically reinterpreted) in the Soviet multinational state. clear that at its core is a vast disparity of power that is expressed not only materially but also in cultural production. However, this disparity does not translate into allpervasive Russian control. Instead, Russian power is best understood as dependent on, and productive of, dispositions and political subjectivities constituted in the relationship itself. 53 The 'state effect' contains an account of power as the effect of performances. In a similar vein, John Allen has proposed a conception of power at a distance. This is power understood as a series of 'relational effects', constituted in social interaction and always mediated in space and time; as he put it, power 'is not some thing or attribute; it cannot be possessed as resources can; and it does not travel'. 54 Resources, be they material or normative, matter for the exercise of powerbut power is only present in concrete, situated relations. 55 Thinking about power in this way is an ontological move away from an understanding of power as inherent in separate entities to a processual understanding in which power is relationally produced and only ever appears in its production.
This means that power is not control by one (collective) actor over another, as the 'sphere of influence' narrative suggests. Instead, it is constitutive of and dependent on political subjectivities on both sides. As Allen argues, this is particularly the case for the relational effect of power as 'seduction', a prevalent form of power at a distance, and as I will suggest below, a concept that captures Russian power in Kyrgyzstan. 91 The former proposed to increase restrictions on NGOs receiving financing from abroad, while the latter banned 'LBTG propaganda'. As several of my interlocutors pointed out, the practice of copying laws is very common, a mixture of a lack of sufficiently welltrained civil servants, and the fact that these laws correspond to local norms and perceptions. 92 At the same time, these 'travelling laws' perpetuate a convergence of legal norms and identifications that further underscores Russia's seductive 'power at a distance' in Kyrgyzstan.
In this vein, it is notable that popular conspiracy theories about the extent of Russian power in the country abound, but often have positive connotations. 93 This is visible not least in the popular conspiracy theory that had Russia orchestrate the overthrow of Bakiev, who was wildly unpopular in Bishkek and the north of the country by the time of his fall. 94 A widespread rumor circulated in the aftermath of the Osh conflict in 2010, claiming that Putin was training a new Kyrgyz president who would be parachuted in from Moscow to strengthen Kyrgyz state-ness. 95 This resonates with a common trope in popular discourse, the interpellation of Putin. At times of political instability, or simply when the Kyrgyz state is experienced as ineffective, statements such as 'if only Putin was here/our president, these issues would be solved' are frequent. 96 These interpellations and conspiracy theories are not just anecdotal; in conjunction with the narrative of fragile statehood in Kyrgyzstan, they tell us something about conceptions of state-ness and the legitimation of power.
Kyrgyzstan's state elites face an ongoing legitimation crisis, which is underpinned by their frequent inability to perform the 'myth of the state'. As the appeal to Putin shows, this is expressed in popular discourse as the failure to produce a strong leader, the embodied sovereign subject.
97
All this is reflected in how these imaginations of 'Russia' are implicated in the ways likewise, Kyrgyz political elites participate in the regional phenomenon of 'summit travelling', the proliferation of summits of these institutions, where more often than not little concrete is achieved. However, these summits provide a useful platform for the display of both personal associations and the trappings of sovereign statehood. 101 These practices secure legitimate power through association with 'Russia' rather than differentiation from it, in direct contravention to a Westphalian logic of sovereignty.
In other words, performing association produces, rather than weakens, the 'state effect'. This can be read as a version of the 'sovereign excess' that has been identified by James D. Sidaway as characteristic for the post-colonial African state. 102 As
Sidaway has pointed out, the globally networked African state is secured by 'how [its] sovereignty is rendered intelligible and represented', achieved precisely in international exchange and association in regional communities -a relationally established 'sovereign excess' rather than the delimitation of sovereignty suggested by the Westphalian geopolitical imagination. when an estimated 100,000 Kyrgyz died and others fled to Afghanistan and China opposing a forced draft into the Tsarist army. 113 There is a generational divide in the constitution of political subjectivities, expressed also in the increasing popularity of post-colonial narratives among the second post-Soviet generation. 114 Again, this is intertwined with more tangible factors: while many Kyrgyz students continue go to
Moscow to study or work, recent years have seen more and more students choosing to study in Asia and the West. 115 In addition to the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University, several English-language universities as well as Turkish schools and universities are present in Kyrgyzstan. 116 In the face of the internationalization of Kyrgyzstan's educated youth, the current pervasiveness of Russian seductive power and the relational production of not-quite-foreignness on which it relies, may well turn out to be a Soviet legacy limited by the passing of time.
All this indicates that Russian power in Kyrgyzstan does not conform to images of a !
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Great Game fought between Great Powers over a passive territory that may be pulled into one or another sphere of influence. This is not simply because local elites can play off different external actors against each other and force them to conform to 'local rules', as Alex Cooley has argued. 117 The conception of space and state that underpins 'sphere of influence' also determines a particular understanding of power:
an intentionalist account of one discrete actor trying to exercise control over another -'power over', to use Steve Luke's well-known typology. 118 However, as has been seen above, insofar as Russian power is pervasive and persuasive, it is because the ineffective. 121 The execution of these soft power strategies is often lacklustre, be they the local branch of Rossotrudnichestvo (a Russian state agency dedicated to 'humanitarian cooperation and the support of Russian compatriots abroad'), the financing of pro-Russian NGOs, academic conferences, targeted media outlets or the (widely rumoured) bribing of MPs before elections. David Lewis cites one Kyrgyz commentator who bluntly stated that in elections 'those who get that money will use it somehow, and then they will quite simply dump Russia'. 122 Attempts to intervene in the public debate are often heavy-handed; at one Russian-organized academic conference attempting to give a positive spin to the events of 1916, the Kyrgyz participants walked out in the face of what they perceived to be a propaganda event. 123 It is noticeable that the negative reporting on Maxim Bakiev in Russian geopolitics' from the fringes to the center of official discourse. 126 The concept of a 'Russian World' (Russkii Mir) has acquired new prominence and has been used to justify Russia's interference in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. 127 Putin has stated that the EEU draws on pre-existing ties reaching back to the Soviet Union. 128 At the same time, the Kremlin is clearly seeking a hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space, expressed in official discourse as 'sphere of privileged interests' (sfera privilegirovannogo interesa) -a neologism without the strong spatial or normative associations of 'sphere of influence', a term that continues to be avoided in anything but a negative sense. 129 The upsurge in Russian statecraft, and the Kremlin's use of military force in meddling in 'frozen conflicts' are ample evidence of this attempt to gain influence. However, it has been noted that in official discourse these geopolitical concepts, be it Russkii Mir or the growing importance of civilizational discourse are diffuse, ambivalent, a 'fuzzy mental atlas', rather than the exclusionary territorial control evoked by 'sphere of influence'. pointed out how conceptions of primacy started to shift to the economic realm before the end of the Cold War; the economic meta-narrative of globalization has accelerated this trend. 133 The myth of the state has proven to be more resilient than suggested by the globalization literature, but the networked nature of the liberal world economy and a perceived need to maintain openness to achieve economic growth is already transforming the spatial assumptions associated with the concept of Great Power.
The 'rising powers' discourse, with its central focus on economic potential, has its origins in an acronym (BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India, China) originally coined by a Goldman Sachs report on investment opportunities in emerging economies. 134 The
Kremlin has sponsored an international economic organization of the same name (adding South Africa), which brings together these non-Western 'rising powers'. In recent years, BRICS has grown from a vague agenda of 'summit travelling' into a network of fledgling financial institutions and mechanisms, including a BRICS development bank, a contingent reserve agreement and an alternative BRICS payments system. 135 Given this new focus on economic success as a key to Great
Power status, and Russia's somewhat precarious status as a 'rising economy', it is entirely plausible that the EEU has economic aims rather than representing a hidden agenda to create a sphere of influence. 136 Originally, the EEU was presented as an integrative project that was aimed at closer association with the EU, China and regional economic organizations in Asia, in the hope of giving Russia a stronger negotiating position as the center of its own regional economic bloc. In Putin's 2011 article launching the idea, the EEU project was explicitly modeled on EU integration, with a geopolitical imagery that alluded to global openness, not exclusionary closure.
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It aimed at developing subsequent links with the EU; as he claimed, 'entry into the Eurasian Union allows each of its participants more quickly and from stronger positions to integrate into Europe', aiming for a common economic space 'from Lisbon to Vladivostok'. 137 The EEU is a spatial and hence geopolitical project, but this does not automatically make it an attempt to recreate the FSU as an exclusive sphere of influence. Instead, it can be read as underpinning Russia's attempt at transformation into a contemporary Great Power, holding its own in a world increasingly dominated by regional economic blocs and trade agreements.
The economic viability of the EEU project always hinged on Ukraine's membership, which then Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich was reluctant to agree to, especially as he was negotiating a EU association agreement at the same time. Asia were much more ambivalent -and in relation to Afghanistan, often cooperative.
When the Kremlin was asked by the Kyrgyz interim government to become militarily involved to help end the conflict in Osh, it declined, unwilling to become embroiled in the complex security situation of the Ferghana valley; here too, there was a degree of cooperation with the US over the issue. 147 China's increased economic engagement in the region, not just Kyrgyzstan, is narrated and performed by the Kremlin in terms of cooperation and interdependence. 148 Contrary to the generalized logics of exclusionary space associated with 'Sphere of Influence', Russian interactions with the post-Soviet space and beyond need to be understood in terms of multiple, ! 24! intersecting spatial logics specific to particular relationships.
Conclusion
As the above has shown, the imaginations of space and state at play between Russia and Kyrgyzstan are much more differentiated and ambiguous than a rigid account of spheres of influence as exclusionary spaces suggests. The understanding of power as exclusive control over territory established through strategies of 'statecraft' suggested by this ontology do not capture either the reach or the limitations of Russian power in Kyrgyzstan. Instead, Russian power should be understood as seductive: pervasive but weak -and only ever present in concrete, situated relationships. Through exchange and association, and not least a mutually resonant 'myth of the state', it is implicated in producing the Kyrgyz 'state effect' and sometimes may be implicated in destabilizing it. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to infer a generalized weakening of sovereignty from Kyrgyz associations with Russia -on the contrary, these associations help produce 'sovereign excess' and thus secure the Kyrgyz state effect.
Russian entanglements with Kyrgyzstan also contribute to producing the Russian 
